FaceForensics++ 2019: six forgery detectors and 204 human observers on 1.8 million manipulated face images
- Authors
- Rössler, Cozzolino, Verdoliva, Riess, Thies, Nießner
- Venue
- 2019 IEEE/CVF International Conference on Computer Vision (ICCV), pages 1 to 11
- Published
FaceForensics++, the 2019 benchmark for manipulated face detection, trained six published forgery detectors on 720 videos manipulated with DeepFakes, Face2Face, FaceSwap and NeuralTextures and reports that the best, an XceptionNet on a tracked face crop, reached 99.26% (accuracy) on raw frames, 95.73% on lightly compressed and 81.00% on heavily compressed frames of 140 test videos, while 204 human observers averaged 68.69%, 66.57% and 58.73% on the same three quality levels (arXiv 1901.08971, Table 1 and Fig. 4, read 10 November 2026). The paper, "FaceForensics++: Learning to Detect Manipulated Facial Images" by Andreas Rössler, Davide Cozzolino, Luisa Verdoliva, Christian Riess, Justus Thies and Matthias Nießner of TU Munich, the University Federico II of Naples and the University of Erlangen-Nuremberg, was published at the 2019 IEEE/CVF International Conference on Computer Vision, pages 1 to 11 (DOI 10.1109/ICCV.2019.00009; Crossref record read 10 November 2026). The arXiv version 3 of 26 August 2019, with its appendix tables, was read in full.
The record is the first face-video entry in the studies index built on a dataset paper rather than a challenge, a year before DFDC 2020. No product sold under a card in this index is a tested method.
Research methods, not products, are the detectors here: five learned classifiers from the literature and one hand-crafted steganalysis feature set with a linear SVM, each retrained by the authors on the FaceForensics++ training split (arXiv 1901.08971, Section 4.2, read 10 November 2026).
What was tested
Detectors tested
| Detector (reference in the paper) | Method | Index card |
|---|---|---|
| XceptionNet [14] | ImageNet-pretrained Xception, final layer replaced, fine-tuned on a 1.3-times enlarged face crop | no card |
| XceptionNet, full image [14] | Same network on the whole resized frame, no face tracking | no card |
| MesoInception-4 [5] | Two inception modules on a 256 by 256 face image | no card |
| Bayar and Stamm [10] | Constrained convolutional layer CNN | no card |
| Rahmouni et al. [51] | Stats-2L CNN with global statistical pooling | no card |
| Cozzolino et al. [17] | Steganalysis features recast as a CNN | no card |
| Steganalysis features plus SVM [27] | Hand-crafted co-occurrence features, linear SVM | no card |
Sample
| Text set | Count | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Pristine images | 366,847 train, 68,511 validation, 73,770 test | Table 3 |
| DeepFakes and Face2Face images | about 366,840 train, 68,510 validation, 73,770 test each | Table 3 |
| FaceSwap and NeuralTextures images | about 291,600 train, 54,620 validation, 59,650 test each | Table 3 |
| Hidden benchmark | 1,000 single frames, labels withheld, unknown resizing and compression | Section 5 |
| Human observers | 204 participants, mostly computer science students; 99 on a PC, 105 on a phone | Section 4.1 and Table 7 |
Methods as named in Table 1 of arXiv 1901.08971.
None of the image or video cards in this index, Hive, Sensity, Reality Defender, Intel FakeCatcher, Deepware, AI or Not or Sightengine, is a tested method. Deepfake-O-Meter hosts a later research detector, AltFreezing, trained on the lightly compressed FaceForensics++ data, and the Intel card quotes a 92.48% gaze-model figure on FaceForensics++ from Intel's own blog; neither is a result printed in this paper.
The dataset holds 1,000 pristine YouTube videos with near-frontal faces, 509,914 frames, manipulated by two face-swap methods (DeepFakes, FaceSwap) and two reenactment methods (Face2Face, NeuralTextures), for over 1.8 million manipulated images; each video is stored raw, with light H.264 compression at quantisation parameter 23 (HQ) and heavy compression at 40 (LQ). Videos were split 720, 140 and 140 into training, validation and test, and every figure below is on the 140 test videos (arXiv 1901.08971, Sections 3 and 4 and Table 3, read 10 November 2026).
Counts as printed in arXiv 1901.08971, Tables 3 and 7 and Sections 4.1 and 5, read 10 November 2026.
Detection is cast as a per-frame binary classification on a 128 by 128 or 256 by 256 face crop found by a tracker, with XceptionNet trained for three epochs on its new output layer and 15 more end to end; the human study showed participants frames of all four methods and pristine frames across the three quality levels (arXiv 1901.08971, Sections 4.1 and 4.2 and Appendix D, read 10 November 2026).
What the study reports
| Metric | Value | Base |
|---|---|---|
| Accuracy trained on all four methods, raw / HQ / LQ (Table 1) | XceptionNet 99.26 / 95.73 / 81.00; MesoNet 95.23 / 83.10 / 70.47; Bayar and Stamm 98.74 / 82.97 / 66.84; Rahmouni 97.03 / 79.08 / 61.18; Cozzolino 98.57 / 78.45 / 58.69; steganalysis plus SVM 97.63 / 70.97 / 55.98; full-image XceptionNet 82.01 / 74.78 / 70.52 | frames of 140 test videos, five classes |
| XceptionNet per class, LQ (Table 5) | DeepFakes 93.36, Face2Face 88.09, FaceSwap 87.42, NeuralTextures 78.06, pristine 75.27 | LQ test frames per class |
| XceptionNet trained per method, LQ (Table 4) | DeepFakes 94.28, Face2Face 91.56, FaceSwap 93.7, NeuralTextures 82.11 | LQ test frames of that method and pristine |
| Human observers, average (Fig. 4) | 68.69% raw, 66.57% HQ, 58.73% LQ | 204 participants |
| Human observers by class, raw (Table 7) | DeepFakes 77.60, Face2Face 49.60, FaceSwap 76.12, NeuralTextures 32.28, pristine 78.19 | 204 participants |
| Hidden benchmark, total accuracy and pristine precision (Table 2) | XceptionNet 70.10 and 52.40; MesoNet 66.00 and 72.60; Bayar and Stamm 61.60 and 46.20; steganalysis 51.80 and 34.00 | 1,000 benchmark images, LQ-trained models |
| XceptionNet by training size, LQ, all methods (Table 6) | 60.55 with 10 videos, 65.76 with 50, 66.81 with 100, 76.01 with 300 | LQ test frames |
| Five-way manipulation classification (Appendix C) | 99.03% raw, 95.42% HQ, 80.49% LQ | test frames |
Every figure below is printed in Table 1 or 2 of the paper or Tables 4 to 7 of the appendix.
Values as printed in arXiv 1901.08971, Tables 1, 2 and 4 to 7, Fig. 4 and Appendix C, read 10 November 2026; all accuracies are per frame.
Two findings carry beyond the headline. First, compression is the variable that matters: every method is above 95% on raw frames and the hand-crafted features at 97.63%, but at the LQ setting the steganalysis features fall to 55.98%, below the 58.73% of human observers, while XceptionNet keeps 81.00%, and the authors attribute the gap to ImageNet pre-training and network capacity (arXiv 1901.08971, Section 4.2 and Table 1, read 10 November 2026). Second, the hidden benchmark is harder than the test split: XceptionNet's total falls from 81.00% on LQ test frames to 70.10% on the 1,000 benchmark images, with precision on pristine images at 52.40%, which the authors trace to randomised quality levels and tracking errors (arXiv 1901.08971, Section 5 and Table 2, read 10 November 2026).
The reenactment methods were the hard cases for people. Human observers scored 32.28% on NeuralTextures frames at raw quality, below chance, and 49.60% on Face2Face, against 77.60% on DeepFakes, because the reenactments "do not introduce a strong semantic change"; the detectors also scored lowest on NeuralTextures at every quality level (arXiv 1901.08971, Section 4.1 and Tables 5 and 7, read 10 November 2026).
Limits the authors state
The authors state that the manipulation methods required near-frontal faces, so clips were manually screened to exclude occlusions and profiles; that the detectors were evaluated per frame rather than per video; that the benchmark accepts one submission every two weeks to limit overfitting; and that compressed and low-quality data need "a large database" to train on (arXiv 1901.08971, Sections 3, 4 and 5 and Fig. 8, read 10 November 2026).
Evident from the paper: the four manipulation methods are 2018 and 2019 tools that swap or reenact a face in real footage rather than generate video; the user study population is mostly computer science students; no false positive rate is printed as such, with pristine-class accuracy and precision standing in; and nothing identifies a commercial product.
Which cards this study feeds
- No card in the index was tested by this record.
- AIDI-R-07AI image, voice, video and code detectors ranked by independent studies
- AIDI-R-02AI detector false positive rates, ranked
No card takes a result line from this record, because no indexed product is a tested method. The record counts toward the video column of studies by modality as a record with zero indexed detectors, and the content type view lists the cards that state video. No figure enters the false positive rate ranking, which ranks cards. The home page lists which AI detectors exist and who has tested them.
Related records: DFDC 2020 is the challenge that followed, where the winning entry reached 65.18% (accuracy) on unseen footage; RAID image 2025 is the index's adversarial image benchmark, with two indexed cards scored.
Questions about this study
How accurate was the best detector in FaceForensics++?
XceptionNet on a tracked face crop reached 99.26% (accuracy) on raw frames, 95.73% on lightly compressed and 81.00% on heavily compressed frames of 140 test videos across four manipulation methods, and 70.10% on the paper's 1,000-image hidden benchmark (arXiv 1901.08971, Tables 1 and 2).
How well did people detect the manipulated faces?
The 204 observers averaged 68.69% on raw, 66.57% on lightly compressed and 58.73% on heavily compressed frames, and scored 32.28% on NeuralTextures and 49.60% on Face2Face reenactments at raw quality against 77.60% on DeepFakes (arXiv 1901.08971, Fig. 4 and Table 7).
Which manipulation methods does FaceForensics++ contain?
Four: DeepFakes and FaceSwap, which replace the face, and Face2Face and NeuralTextures, which transfer expressions, applied to 1,000 YouTube videos for over 1.8 million manipulated images at three compression levels (arXiv 1901.08971, Section 3 and Table 3).
Did FaceForensics++ test any commercial deepfake detector?
No: the six methods are published research classifiers retrained by the authors, and no card in this index appears among them; later detectors trained on the dataset, such as the one hosted on Deepfake-O-Meter, are not results of this paper (arXiv 1901.08971, Section 4.2).
Source and revisions
Source
Rössler, A., Cozzolino, D., Verdoliva, L., Riess, C., Thies, J., Nießner, M. (2019). FaceForensics++: Learning to Detect Manipulated Facial Images. Proceedings of the 2019 IEEE/CVF International Conference on Computer Vision (ICCV), 1 to 11, DOI 10.1109/ICCV.2019.00009; read as arXiv:1901.08971 v3 (26 August 2019, with appendix), https://arxiv.org/abs/1901.08971 and https://arxiv.org/pdf/1901.08971, both read 10 November 2026. Conference record: Crossref https://api.crossref.org/works/10.1109/ICCV.2019.00009, read 10 November 2026.


). Illuminarty, one of four cards added in the same wave, joined with its one image record from Ha and Passananti 2024, so 18 of 72 cards now qualify.: register plate](/img/independently-tested-480.webp)
